INTRODUCTION
It is appropriate at a meeting concerned with the use of nuclear power and propulsion devices in space to mention some of the steps taken to assure safety in that use. Yet this subject is too extensive to permit any comprehensive coverage in a single paper. The best one can hope for is to present some idea of the nature of the problems involved, of the approaches taken to deal with them, of the testing by which the soundness of those approaches is continuously being explored, and of the results of operational experience.
To supplement the account in this paper, the reader is urged to consult the references. They are by no means comprehensive, but they can introduce their readers to space nuclear safety and point them to further sources.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Nuclear safety as used here simply means those steps taken to assure that neither operating personnel nor the general public are unduly exposed to nuclear radiation or radioactive materials through use of space nuclear systems. It includes the precautions taken to mitigate the consequences of any such exposure that might occur. (Facility protection is also a factor in nuclear safety planning, but vjill not be considered here.)
Nuclear safety for a space system is not an end which can be pursued without regard to other considerations ( Fig. 1 ). It must not cause undue penalties in weight, reliability, or development expense. The user of a space nuclear power supply measures performance in terms of watts per kilogram of total system weight. Heat source weight, safety system weight, and power convertor weight make up that total; no one part can become disproportionately large without jeopardizing system acceptance.
A nuclear safety system tending to compromise the overall reliability of a spacecraft or space mission by undue complexity or undue reaction sensitivity is not likely to be tolerated. Safety development costs may be -2-a substantial part of system costs and also figure in user acceptance.
Safety must be attained, but its pursuit has constraints.
Safety is integral to the system. It must be considered from the inception of a project, and it is in its details specific to each project (even though it has some universal elements among many projects). It cannot be legislated, or accomplished by rules laid down from afar, for each space system is unique in terms of the nuclear units it needs and can accept and is unique in the environments and potential hazards to which its nuclear units may be exposed. Thus safety has to be considered and incorporated into every stage of a project, from system design, research and development, and hardware procurement, through installation and use.
It must be accepted as a responsibility of everyone involved in these activities -by the nuclear system contractor, by the AEC/NASA project office and by the mission and user project offices. It cannot be left to external safety reviewers. Such persons render judgements when the work is completed; they do not and cannot build safety into that which they review.
To the extent possible, standardisation of space nuclear system safety approaches is desirable. Development of safety criteria for newly emerging systems; standardization of safety documentation; standardization of analytical, experimental, and computational techniques; formalization of safety review procedures; development of systematic contingency planning; and establishment of routine operational safety procedures are all important goals whose attainment can greatly expedite the transition between the sporadic use of a few prototype systems and the routine use of many space nuclear systems.
But standardization in approach to safety questions is feasible only to the extent that consistent elements underlie the safety issues for separate systems. Standardization should never become so sought after or acceptable that it is allowed to disguise real differences between systems or conceal the uniqueness of particular problems. Nor should it be allowed to lead to complacency, for safety research and safety technology -3-should advance with the needs and potentialities of the times. Evolution in ideas and approaches should occur. New concepts, techniques, and devices should be created. New methods should be proposed and tried.
Adaptation is important: The abilities to track, deorbit, locate and recover conventional spacecraft apply equally to nuclear spacecraft; improvements in these abilities -if understood and accepted into nuclear safety planning -may provide new possibilities and alternatives for safe use.
POTENTIAL SAFETY PROBLEMS
Both radioisotope and reactor systems offer a variety of potential safety problems. Some are intrinsic, deriving from the nature of the systems themselves, while others are extrinsic, arising as possible consequences of individual or sequential external occurrences unrelated to the presence of a nuclear system.
Intrinsic problems associated with radioisotopic power systems might include excessive gas buildup (from a decay), excessive heat, material diffusion, change in form or stability, chemical reaction, radiation damage, and the like (Fig. 2) . Radioisotopic systems liberate heat at a rate determined only by their initial charge of material and its subsequent decay. Source-associated problems are present throughout the system's life.
The utter insensitivity of radioactive decay to external events partially decouples radioisotopic sources from such events, though the presence of internal heat may modify their responses.
In general, few safety-related intrinsic operating problems actually arise in radioisotopic sources. Their character and persistence helps make them recognizable and ground detectable. They can be effectively countered by good design, backed by normal quality assurance and reliability controls.
Unoperated reactor systems possess no internal heat and introduce no problems of intrinsic type before startup. But during normal operation they require coolant, and even after operation they may possess a sub- In general, the intrinsic problems of reactor systems are also of such a nature that they need concern us little here. They are not likely to result in enough kinetic energy generation to cause reactor disassembly and premature return of material from space, so it is only necessary that control rod motion and (therefore) startup be proscribed until attainment of a long-lived orbit. Postoperational decay will then assure that reactors offer no significant terrestrial consequence. (Any criticality engendered on return from space would produce new fission products, and must be avoided, but means are available for doing this.)
Both types of nuclear systems may be subjected to extrinsic, (externally-induced) circumstances or events affecting their integrity (Fig. 3) . It is important to remember that these individually-significant external events may come in sequence. For example, there could be shock or missile effects from explosion at high altitude, followed by reentry he at ing, then imp act.
Nuclear reactors and radioisotope systems intended for space applications have to be examined in relation to these single hazards and sequences of hazards. Responses differ for the two systems. Reactors may gain reactivity through compaction (as from explosion or impact) or through imm!ersion in water or hydrocarbon fuels. A reactor's ability to be critical though it has internal voids or only has a (nuclearly) finite reflector, can give it a susceptibility to external events that radioisotopic systems do not possess.
PHILOSOPHY OF APPROACH
Good safety policy requires attention to all potential problems, whether arising internally or externally, but it is usually the latter which pose the most difficulty and concern. The conditions accompanying externally induced accidents or malfunctions are highly imprecise and difficult to specify and their effects are ambiguous in consequence. How then is this problem to be handled?
It has already been hinted that few ideas addressed to a single aspect of a system, such as safety, can be translated into hardware in the -6-dynamic and weight-limited environment of a space vehicle without compromising some other aspect of performance. An "optimally"performing"
and "perfectly safe" system will never be flown.' What must be done in the case of a real system which one might like to fly -one offering adequate performance and promising safety -is to somehow determine what might happen to it under normal or accident conditions when flown and then to assess on a probabilistic basis what those happenings could mean and decide whether there is sufficient safety in the consequences. One goal is to establish that the nuclear system can suitably sustain not merely the most probable accidents but also all accidents of low probability which have severe potential consequences for any local or general population.
Only if it can do this is it satisfactory.
The philosophy that seems best suited to this goal ( Let us suppose that hardxirare offering improved safety is proposed and'appears feasible. The design is first thoroughly analyzed with respect to its normal behavior and performance and analyzed with respect to its response under postulated accident conditions. It is finally subjected, in the development phase, to a series of rigorous and severe tests in simulated accident environments. It must confirm its expectations by per forming satisfactorily in all these and meet normal reliability and quality assurance specifications before being accepted as a new candidate design.
But to this valuable, stringent, and formalistic approach of terrestrial nuclear systems, further insights m.ust be added. Not all potential accidents, accident environments, nor conceptual accident sequences can be simulated. To estimate their likely effects, the elements of probability analysis must be invoked. One must ask: What is the chance of this -7-occurring or going wrong, what is the probability that this first event will be accompanied with or followed by this or that further occurrence, what then the probability of third occurrences, etc? If these chances can be expressed for all conceptual possibilities -for every chain of events, the "probability tree" so formed would give a complete representation of the liklihood and potential severity of all conceivable happenings.
The result will be knox-m no better than the individual probabilities are known or expressable, so it is important that these probabilities be tied to realism to the closest extent possible. This is not as difficult as might at first be supposed. One may be able to use experienced probabilities for abort before a certain time or altitude, to use real probabilities for occurrence of pad fires, for destruct, for tracking error, location of impact points, recovery of source, and so forth. Any probability -real or assumed -should be reevaluated and updated as knowledge or experience changes. Conservatism in favor of safety is important, too, but one should know when, where, and how he is employing it.
For purposes of illustration (only) one might make the following assessment of the probability of a system impacting from short orbit (an orbit less than one year) on land in a rural area with some attendant fuel release:
P-i Po ^o P/ P:; P^ = P 1 where 12 3 4 5 6 release -3 P = Probability of short orbit = 1.7 x 10 (improper injection in long orbit) P = Probability of land impact = land/(land plus water) == 2.6 x 10 -1 P" = Probability of rural impact = 8.6 x 10 -1 P, = Probability of non-burial = 6 x 10 -2 P,. = Probability of hard surface = 10 5 ' -1 P^ = Probability of capsule failure = 5 x 10 (on hard surface, etc.)
for some fuel release = 1.1 x 10~ for this particular kind of event.
-8-One would have to go further and estimate the nature of this fuel release, via other probabilities, before making a conclusion about the likely consequences of this single event. For example, available impact test data might show that little fuel would be released from the subject fuel capsule even on hard impact, that little of that might be in respirable "fines", that only a few percent of fines produced by impacting a non-yielding surface might be raised to a height adequate for atmospheric dispersion, etc.
Quantification of these factors would permit an estimate of the quantity and distribution of potentially respirable source. That in turn could be applied to a population probability distribution in order to finally derive the chance, and the nature of the chance, that some individuals would be affected by this one type of event. The procedure then would be repeated for all events, both more and less probable and more and less hazardous, whereupon a proper feeling for the overall risk attendant to the operation would become known. A decision to proceed or not could then be made, based on what that risk was and its relation to mission need.
It is clear that such an analysis, though difficult, has many virtues. It can reveal important but possibly neglected events. It can highlight weaknesses in design. It can suggest fruitful areas for improvment, i.e., it can help put the effort where the safety payoff will be large. And it provides an intelligent and rational approach which gets away from the impossible dream that "absolutely everything must be always safe under every circumstance."
In the latter respect it is akin to what we already do in everyday life. We all have some feeling, albeit often intuitive, of the probabilities of unfortunate events -i.e., of the chance we will be in an airplane crash, of the chance wo will be hit by a cs.r upon crossing a street, of the chance we will slip on the ice and break our leg, and so forth. We subconsciously weigh those probabilities and their consequences against our needs and desires as we decide whether or not to take an airplane trip, whether to dart through traffic or wait, whether to walk or take the streetcar. And the important thing is not that our knowledge -9-and judgement in such matters need be perfect; it is important only that it be sufficiently good.
There is one more item basic to the philosophy of a sound space nuclear safety program. That is contingency planning. Intensive reliability analyses and tests minimize the frequency of aborts, but they do occur. A whole spectrum of range safety practices and contingency must be ready to deal with them. Familiar range countermeasures include vehicle destruct plans, alternate flight plans, and personnel exclusion areas to minimize the consequences of potential aborts. But further contingency plans should also be developed, employing the conservative assumption that an abort will occur and that well-calculated post-abort actions will minimize its consequences. The aim should be to consider in advance the steps needed to combat any possible malfunction and to assure that the needed personnel and equipment will be on hand with preplanned action if it occurs.
An illustration of this is provided by the Apollo 13 mission. When there was a rather violent fuel cell oxygen tank failure on the service module, the Apollo 13 mission aborted in translunar flight. Yet the astronauts returned safely to earth using the life support and propulsion system of the lunar module in a linked command, service, and lunar module configuration which afforded them a "lifeboat" until just before reentry. To date, there has been but one reactor system launched, while about fifteen radioisotopic pov/er systems have been used, of which some employed multiple heat sources. The radioisotopic systems are the more thoroughly developed, so this discussion will mainly concern them. All employed to date have power supplies by converting the decay heat of plutonium-238 to electricity by use of Pb-Te thermoelectries.
The first of the isotopic Space Nuclear Auxiliary Power, or SNAP, systems to be launched in space were the 2.7 and 25 (electrical) watt SNAP-3's and SNAP-9's. The use was on Transit navigational satellites. The fuel 238 was Plutonium metal ( Pu), encased in an assembly which could contain it during severe ground accidents or early flight mishaps but assured of releasing it during reentry in the event the launch system did not achieve an earth orbit. This approach was partly suggested by the low melting point (600 C) and high oxidation rate of the fuel. The attraction in this form of disposal was the long residence time and large dilution factor resulting from oxidationJ vaporization, and dispersal at high altitudes.
After numerous ground tests verified adequate containment with respect to ground accidents, two SNAP-3's were launched in 1961. They are still in orbit and their orbit lifetimes will exceed 1000 years. The thermoelectric generator on one still functions to provide some power.
When the SNAP-9 systems were designed, at approximately ten times the power of the SNAP-3's, the basic safety approach was similar. Internally, however, the ten-fold-larger inventory of plutonium metal fuel was subdivided and inserted into six capsules, each assured of reentry burnup, yet each capable of surviving severe surface launch abort environments.
The last one launched in this series, in April 1964, did abort and the where the water depth was about 100 meters. Previous analysis and testing which had been done left little doubt that the two fuel capsules were intact. The capsules had survived test circumstances more difficult than -12-those of impact. The generator casing materials, capsule materials, and fuel had all been tested in the ocean and the low dissolution of the fuel was known. Though safety was considered assured, the contingency plan, calling for establishment of precautionary air and water monitoring, was executed as part of the pre-planned emergency response and maintained until the abort conditions were fully clarified. NASA, AEC, and DOD then proceeded to institute joint recovery actions as part of this plan.
There was little urgency in this, but the fuel was an economic asset, postmortem information on the actual abort performance of the heat sources was desired, and the challenge afforded by this unique opportunity needed to be met. The recovery story is a rather fascinating one, involving side-looking sonar and remote television, heavy seas, prolonged delays or halts, use of a small manned submersible (which located and photographed the capsules),
and even use of a diver in full diving apparatus to accompany the capsules to the surface in recovery to insure they were not lost. Recovery was accomplished nearly six months after the abort. Subsequent examination showed that the capsules had experienced no deleterious effects from the destruct action, impact, or residence on the ocean bottom, and the graphite ablators surrounding the capsules were intact ( has been subjected to fragments having velocities up to 3200 feet per second. The effects of SATURN V fireball and afterfire were also examined, and it was concluded that the fuel cask would survive these when protected by its graphite ablator and/or the secondary beryllium heat shield it contained.
Nevertheless, it was possible to postulate some unique and rather illdefined but formidable accident environments which could potentially degrade exposed microspheres. These were known to be conditions of very low occurrence probability, requiring for example the simultaneous release of microspheres into a fireball at the time of fireball initiation, with the fireball itself being of a size attainable only by the catastrophic launch pad abort of the entire vehicle. But the possibility in principle on such conditions meant that safety policies based on "containment" should be reviewed and that they might need modification or clarification.
The policy answer to that review, as of today, is usually expressed by the word "immobilization". The concept is aimed directly at the fundamental safety problems of fuel inhalation and widespread ground contamination. The intent is to interdict the formation, release, dispersion and 238 human inhalation of respirable (< 3 microns) particles of Pu during and after an accident involving a nuclear power supply. This intent is of course satisfied by "containment" in its classical sense. However, this is probably not realistically achievable over the wide spectrum of potential abort environments which can be postulated. Perfect containment 238 over the active life of the fuel (for Pu the half-life is ~87 years)
would not only require that a pressure-tight vessel, free of minor cracks, survive the most severe abort environments but it should also experience no consequential degradation for decades thereafter. Rather than thinking purely in terms of containment then, one should think in terms of aims. 238 The aims of safety are generally satisfied if Pu release rates can be TOO controlled so that the total amount of Pu aerosols entering the environment is kept belox^^ permissible levels at any time during and after an -14-accident. Immobilization seeks to achieve this by making beneficial collective use of the properties of the fuel form, the heat source materials, and the environment itself. It does not interfere with the policy of returning errant heat sources to radiological control whenever possible, but demands that the fuel be biologically inert should this not be possible.
New fuel forms have been evolved to aid the immobilization goals. One step in this evolution was developed at the Los Alamos Scientific Labora-238 tory. It was to use PuO^ feed material, mix it with 10% ThO to enhance thermal and chemical stability above that of microspheres, and prepare this into solid solution particles deliberately pre-sized above the respirable range. These particles were coated with molybdenum, hot-pressed into a disc as shown in Figure 6 , and the disc was coated with molybdenum by vapor deposition.
Several of the significant safety attributes of this fuel form have been set down by Dix (Ref. 4) . "By virtue of its shape, reentry heating is minimized, and its conductivity is greater than PuO_, which lowers reentry surface temperatures. It is more resistant to the impulsive loads of high velocity impact and more energy is required to degrade it into respirable particles. Its surface area is smaller than an equivalent thermal inventor^' of microspheres, which yields considerably less vaporization into a SATURN-type fireball. Finally, the pre-sized solid solution 238 particles immobilize the Pu more effectively and the refractory cermet matrix and disc coating has to yield to the rigors of the abort spectrum before the particles can be exposed and degraded to evolve any respirable "8pu". Each part has a purpose: The liner aids in the task of encapsulating -15-fuel discs, the strength member offers high thermal stability and superior impact strength at high temperatures (it is to deform under impact and retain the fuel), and the clad provides oxidation protection for the strength member.
The heat source assembly consists of the fuel capsule together with the material which adapts it to the generator and protects it in abort situations. Principal parts of the Transit RTG heat source (Fig. 9) , outside the fuel capsule, are its graphite "heat shield", the pyrographite "thermal barrier" body and sleeves, and an inconel can. In reentry, the graphite acts as an ablator while the pyrographite inhibits the influx of heat to the fuel capsule. The graphite ablator is protected against oxidation during ground operations by the inconel.
New radioisotope heat sources are evolving toward assemblages of special design, containing individual small units of fuel capable of operating at higher temperature, and providing their own reentry and impact protection. This is illustrated in Fig. 10 . Each of the 24 fuel spheres in this Helipak assembly is contained in its own iridium shell and protected by a wound graphite impact shell. The fuel is pure plutonium dioxide ceramic. Each sphere develops about 100 watts of thermal power. Impact testing of these plutonium dioxide fueled spheres at about 280 feet per second against granite has begun at Los Alamos. This fuel form offers promise and may be developable into an efficient generator meeting the immobilization criterion. Other concepts for distributing the fuel into modular survivable reentry bodies are also being explored.
This account of fuel development illustrates the constant interplay that goes on between design objectives, safety needs, test results, and flight experience. It reminds us again that safet37 does cost, that safety considerations are inseparable from system considerations, that standardized approaches assist in comparison and evaluation, and that evolution in approach is logical and necessary.
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OTHER TESTS AND OTHER SObUCES
We have looked briefly at changes in radioisotopic heat sources in response to program needs, safety considerations, antilytical and ground test results, and flight experience. Each of these areas has broad implications -testing for example -and we could extend the discussion to other sources.
Analysis and testing embrace many activities. This is seen by looking at Fig. 11 , which was compiled a few years back to point out areas in which standardization of approach appeared useful. (The benefits to be gained by having systematic and standardized means of making comparisons are that work at different laboratories or under different test conditions can be meaningfully correlated, the program guidance latent in the work becomes more readily apparent, and the number of tests and analyses required for a given level of understanding can be rediiced.) In each of the roughly 30 different areas on this list, and in others as well, research is being done or has been done. It is intended to do such research to appropriate degree for every nuclear system of concern whether that is a small source or a reactor.
Small sources, which may be used for thrusters, for heat for life support or thermal control, or for gages, detectors, dial illuminators, density meters, calibrators, etc. have been launched in considerable number.
Though the safety problems they pose are usually small, they are treated 241 with respect. It is noteworthy that a small Am source on the Nimbus B satellite was also recovered from the Santa Barbara channel and returned to radiological control along with SNAP-19s.
Testing on a large nuclear system goes on in all areas listed in Fig.   11 , often in sequence. The Pioneer program gives examples. Pioneer heat sources, in Comparative Impact Tests, were heated to proper temperature and impacted at various orientations against granite blocks just to study the source vulnerability to this one variable. In Launch Abort Sequential
Tests, the test paths followed by the various heat sources were all proper preheat. The apparatus employed was wide-ranging.
Complex tests or test series like these are planned, conducted, analyzed and reviewed for any system to which they are appropriate, extending even to reactors. Reactor configurations realistic in all major re*, spects, except for special engineering to provide very high rates of reactivity insertion, have been deliberately tested to destruction in the SNAPTRAN tests and the KIWI Transient Nuclear Test. The aim was to test the validity of codes predicting excursion size from reactivity insertion parameters under extreme conditions, even beyond those representing "worst"
accidents. The results showed the theory to give a good representation of behaviour in such cases and in fact to be a bit on the conservative side.
The knowledge gained in reactor transient tests such as these is valuable because it serves to normalize the codes under extreme conditions and it lends confidence to their use in other circumstances.
-18-
COUNTERMEASURES
The conducting of such reactor excursion tests does not mean that comparable accidents are expected to occur. It appears possible to guard against them quite effectively. Orifice jets can mechanically limit hydraulic flows -wherever such flows are used for control, "poison wires"
can be inserted and retained in reactor cores until startup to prevent excursions from immersion as a result of launch accidents, reflector or reactor parts can be jettisoned and reactor disassembly can be effected either thermally or explosively to prevent criticality on reentry.
Countermeasures of various kinds have been mentioned throughout this paper. Others exist. Auxiliary thrust systems can sometimes be used to raise or lower payload velocities, possibly providing the necessary margin to establish a "safe" orbit or to de-orbit instead if that is desired. at an early date. A three step documentation and review process commencing at the conceptual phase has been used to meet this need (Fig. 12) .
The general purpose of this process is to: 
2.
Provide reviewers with a basis for performing an independent assessment of the system to see if it meets applicable nuclear safety criteria.
3.
Provide the supporting documentation necessary to seek and obtain interagency flight approval.
The content and input requirements of these safety documents were usually reviewed with the systems contractor prior to contract negotiations and actions he is to take on receipt of safety evaluations have been outlined. The direct line responsibility has resided with the project offices. When large nuclear systems are involved, the review ultimately feeds into an Interagency Safety Evaluation Panel, (Fig. 13) , composed of members and advisors drawn from the AEC, NASA, and the DOD.
Each of these three panel agencies submits a report and recommendations through its agency head to the National Aeronautics and Space
Council for its consideration and judgement. They in turn may submit the matter to the President for his approval.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
There is no way of assuring perfect safety for any human activity, including that of operating nuclear power and propulsion devices in space.
But there are some ways of addressing safety questions which elucidate the problems more clearly than others, and ways of proceeding which combat the risk more fully than others. It is suggested that the approach outlined here has those merits. It seeks to incorporate safety into the system from its inception, to explicitly identify and quantify the risks, to adopt measures reducing those risks, and to provide a program of analysis, test, and review which assures that those risks are adequately countered before decisions to launch are made.
This approach has been successful in practice. There is reason to believe it will be successful in the future, for, though the safety problems 
